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Abstract
We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects
productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers’ productivity under a
welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with
their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional
on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that
having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers
conditional or unconditional, increases workers’ productivity. Second, we find that
productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed
under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably
due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment
benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences
we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra non-
monetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work.
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1 Introduction
This paper uses data from a field-experiment designed to investigate whether the type of
unemployment benefit system affects the productivity of workers. According to the In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO), 42% of the countries worldwide have some type
of statutory unemployment benefit institution (hereafter UBI) that provides a safety net
for the households and acts as an automatic stabilizer of the economy (ILO, 2010). Some
countries, like most Western European nations and developing countries like Colombia, im-
plement the so called “welfare” scheme, which consists of an unconditional cash transfer
to the unemployed. Others like Argentina, Australia and Brazil, implement the so called
“workfare” scheme instead, which consists on monetary transfers to the unemployed condi-
tional on the recipient performing some kind of work in return. Yet, a third set of countries
like the US, the UK and Chile offer both “welfare” and “workfare”-type programs.1
Despite being widely implemented worldwide, little is known about the impact of these
institutions on the economy.2 For instance, one relevant concern, that has however been
largely understudied, is the effect of these institutions on workers’ productivity. From a
purely economic point of view, one would expect productivity of workers under welfare
UBIs to be the lowest, simply because an unconditional unemployment benefit should make
the cost of being unemployed lower than under workfare UBIs, and also lower than under
no UBI. However, this argument overlooks the effects of unemployment on the psycholog-
ical well-being of the unemployed (see Darity and Goldsmith, 1996, for a review), which
may differ across UBIs. Once we allow for the psychological aspects to affect the cost of
unemployment, this prediction becomes less clear.
Investigating these questions using observational data is challenging for several reasons.
To name only a few, the implementation of different UBIs is likely to be correlated with
country-specific institutional characteristics that may affect workers’ productivity through
other channels. Moreover, obtaining independent and objective measures of individual-level
productivity is a difficult task, as it is finding the right counterfactual for assessing how these
measures are affected by the specific UBI in place. For these reasons, we designed a novel
field-experiment that allowed us to study this matter. In a nutshell, we created employment
and unemployment in the field. We recorded daily measures of workers’ productivity under
different UBIs and collected psychological traits of employed and unemployed workers before
and during the project.
We hired over 300 students from two major private Universities in Bogotá, Colombia
1See Ochel (2005) for a survey on workfare programs and Gueron (1990) for a discussion on the two types
of schemes.
2There is work on the effect of different variations of welfare schemes (e.g. different sizes of the monetary
benefit, different application requirements, different maturities of the benefit) on unemployment duration,
search effort, and reservation wages (e.g. Abbrig et al., 2005, Boone et al., 2007). However, to our knowledge,
there is no empirical evidence comparing the effects of welfare versus workfare schemes, or versus a situation
without unemployment benefits.
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(University of Rosario and University of Los Andes), to work as research assistants for
a one-month period. Their job was to code into a computer spreadsheet news on local
politicians taken from the online archives of Colombian newspapers. Individual productivity
was measured by counting the number of news correctly codified. Before starting the job,
students were informed that the demand for coders would vary from day to day. Some days
there would be a shortage of vacancies and those with lower productivity would become
temporarily unemployed. Some other days there would be an increase in the demand for
coding allowing some of the unemployed to return to work.
The experiment was implemented in two separate stages, with the task described being
the same in both. In one stage, we ran simultaneously two identical Control interventions
in each university. This constituted the benchmark of our analysis and resembled a system
in which no UBI is in place. Indeed, the unemployed in this stage received no monetary
compensation, independent of their university. In another stage each university was assigned
to one UBI, with all the employees within each university receiving the same treatment. We
chose this design to avoid the type of spillovers and contamination that would arise if peers
or classmates from the same university were hired to do the same job under different working
conditions.3 Students employed in U. Rosario were assigned to a Welfare UBI treatment,
and hence if became unemployed were given an unconditional monetary compensation,
equivalent to 30% of the daily salary of their employed peers. Students employed in U.
Andes were assigned to a Workfare UBI treatment, and hence the unemployed received an
equivalent (30% of daily salary) compensation in exchange for spending 30 minutes (one
third of a coding shift) doing an administrative task.4
To identify the effect of the different UBIs on the productivity of workers, we use a
difference-in-differences specification to compare the productivity differential of the two
groups based in U. Rosario (Welfare and Control) with the differential productivity of the
two groups based in U. Andes (Workfare and Control). We find that the UBI-affected
workers are more productive than their Control peers in both cases, which suggests that
both Workfare and Welfare generate productivity gains compared to the baseline without
any UBI. Most importantly, the productivity gain of the Welfare employees more than
doubles that of their Workfare counterparts, which suggests that the utility loss of being
unemployed is higher under Welfare, even in the absence of any task that entails a costly
effort.
This result seems to be at odds with the conventional economics perspective. Because
effort is costly, when facing the possibility of being laid off people should try to avoid
unemployment more under a workfare-type UBI than under a welfare one. Hence, we
3We explain our design with further detail in Section 3.
4We could have also considered a training-type UBI in which the monetary compensation is received
upon participation in a training program. However, we did not implemented this type of scheme because we
wanted to focus on the most used systems worldwide, i.e. welfare and workfare. Considering a training-type
UBI is interesting on its own, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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investigate potential non-economic mechanisms that may drive our results. Notably, we
observe a significant drop in the self-esteem of workers who become unemployed under the
Welfare treatment, suggesting that being offered a monetary benefit while unemployed and
idle comes at a psychological cost. According to the psychology literature this cost could be
associated with shame or stigma. Importantly, we do not observe a differential drop in self-
esteem of the unemployed workers under Workfare or in the Control treatment, suggesting
that the psychological cost is not a consequence of just being unemployed, but rather of
being unemployed and being offered money in exchange of nothing. It is the combination
of these two factors what seems to be triggering the observable psychological cost.
We explore potential heterogeneous effects across different types of workers. We find
that the biggest proportion of the productivity differences across treatments is explained
by workers who never experienced unemployment during the duration of the project. This
suggests that workers under Welfare anticipate this psychological cost, and react by putting
higher effort and being more productive than workers under the other schemes. This result
is in line with the recent literature on ego utility, where people take costly actions to protect
their self-esteem (see Kőszegi, 2006).5
We investigate alternative mechanisms that could also explain our results, like employ-
ees’ reciprocity towards the employers, but we find no evidence in their favor, providing
further support to our interpretation.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, while the literature
on incentives and workers’ productivity studies the effect of incentive schemes provided
within the working place (like different types of compensation, Prendergast 1999), we show
how productivity responds to (economic and psychological) incentives provided outside the
working place. Second, we contribute to the literature on the labor market consequences
of unemployment benefits (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006 for a recent review). For
instance, we complement Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), who study how UBIs affect ex-ante
productivity by determining the type of jobs the unemployed apply to. In contrast, we show
how UBIs affect productivity ex-post, once the job has been chosen.6 Third, by showing
how the UBI interacts with the psychological impact of unemployment on self-esteem, the
paper contributes to the literature on the psychological effects of unemployment. We show
that unemployment affects self-esteem only when the unemployed receive an unconditional
monetary compensation. Finally, from a methodological point of view, this paper illustrates
how observational data in labor economics can be complemented with data gathered from
field experiments for the purpose of studying labor market institutions and outcomes. The
closest related paper in this respect is Black et al. (2003), who use random assignment
5See also De Hooge, Breugelmans and Zeelenberg (2008) for evidence on shame avoidance as motivator
of behavior.
6Besley and Coate (1992) develop a theoretical model to compare welfare versus workfare-type schemes.
Their focus is however different from ours, as they study the optimal design of workfare programs considering
that work requirements may serve as screening and deterrence devices.
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to the unemployment insurance system to show that the threat of being forced to take up
reemployment training services reduces the duration of the benefit. In contrast, we do not
look at training for reemployment but instead we look at the work requirement to receive
the benefit, and focus on productivity as outcome instead of the duration of unemployment.
Falk, et al. (2006) run a laboratory experiment on the effect of UBIs on labor supply. In
the experiment, the job of ‘employees’ is counting the number of zeros in a zeroes-and-ones
matrix printed on a sheet of paper. An important feature of our design is that we are able
to precisely measure workers’ productivity without departing from a natural job setting.
Their study, which suggests a positive effect of a workfare-type UBI on labor supply, does
not look at the effect on productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple conceptual eco-
nomic framework that illustrates how the different UBIs should affect workers productivity
under standard economic assumptions. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Sec-
tion 4 describes the characteristics of the sample and the data collected in the experiment.
Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 studies the underlying mechanism
behind the main result and revisits the economic framework of Section 2. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this Section, we present a simple framework that allows us to derive basic hypotheses
on how the UBI influences workers’ effort and hence their productivity. We will use this
framework as the economic benchmark to contrast our results with. Hence, at this point
we only use standard economic assumptions.
In our experiment, workers receive a fix wage independent of their effort, so in principle,
they would have incentives to shirk. However, the possibility of being laid off depends on
workers’ relative productivity (i.e. workers’ relative effort), which counterbalances these
incentives. Unemployment then acts as a discipline device for workers as in Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), and the incentive to shirk will depend on the costs and benefits of unem-
ployment.7 The key characteristic of the model we introduce here is that these costs and
benefits will differ across the three interventions considered in our experiment. In other
words, workers’ incentives to shirk depend only on the unemployment benefit system they
are assigned to in the experiment.8
7In a framework without unemployment there would be no penalty for shirking so workers would always
choose to shirk.
8Although our setting shares similar features with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), it is essentially different
in that we exogenously impose the unemployment rate, the unemployment benefit and the wage. For that
reason, we do not need to model the decision of the employer (wages are set exogenously in our experiment)
and we only focus on the decision of the employee to exert effort while employed.
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2.1 Set up
Consider a fixed number, N , of identical workers, all of whom obtain utility from consump-
tion and disutility from exerting effort. We assume for simplicity that the utility function
of the representative worker is separable and that workers are risk neutral. Thus, we can
write the instantaneous utility function of a worker as U(w, e) = w−e, where w is the wage
received and e is the level of effort exerted on his job. Let us further assume, also for sim-
plicity, that workers can provide either minimal effort (e = 0), or some fixed positive level,
e > 0.9 Each worker is in one of two states at any point in time: employed or unemployed.
When employed, the worker has to choose an effort level e. If the worker does not shirk,
he receives a wage of w and looses his job with probability b. If a worker shirks, he looses
his job with probability q.10 The worker selects an effort level to maximize his expected
present discounted value of utility with a discount rate r > 0. This involves comparing the
expected lifetime utility of a non-shirker employed, V NE , with the expected lifetime utility
of an unemployed worker, VU . Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984)’s “fundamental asset equation”
for an employed shirker is:
rV SE = w + (b+ q)(VU − V SE ) (1)
V SE represents the “asset value”, w is the “flow benefit”and the expected “capital
gain”(actually a loss) is the probability of job loss for a shirker (b+ q) times the amount of
utility lost by becoming unemployed (VU − V SE ). The real interest rate and utility discount
rate are both equal to the constant r. Likewise, the “fundamental asset equation” for an
employed non-shirker is:
rV NE = w − e+ b(VU − V NE ) (2)




w + (b+ q)VU
r + b+ q
(3)
V NE =
(w − e) + bVU
r + b
(4)
9We make this assumption in order to keep our framework as close as possible to Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984)’s seminal model. However we note that, including effort as a continuous variable would not change
the qualitative results.
10Both b and q are assumed to be exogenous to the worker. In our experiment, however, both are decreasing
in worker’s relative performance and increasing in the unemployment rate of the following day. None of these
factors are known to the worker. Arguably, workers may have prior beliefs about their relative performance
and they could in principle update their beliefs during the period of the project. Introducing this to the
model, however, would only complicate the set up without adding anything essential. Recall that our main
aim is to compare behavior across treatments, and insofar as learning of these parameters is not significantly
different across treatments, treating b and q as exogenous parameters in our model does not come at any
cost.
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The worker will choose not to shirk if and only if V NE > V
S
E , which implies
w > rVU +




q(V SE − VU ) > e (6)
That is, unless there is a penalty associated with unemployment, everyone will shirk.
Moreover, equation (6) implies that the higher the penalty (i.e. the higher q or the lower the
expected utility of unemployment VU ) the lower are the incentives for a worker to shirk. The
key idea of our experimental design is, precisely, to test this result, by exogenously varying
VU in a way that resembles the most used unemployment benefit systems worldwide.
2.2 The Utility of an Unemployed Worker under Different Schemes
How does VU differ across treatments? To answer this question, we look at the cost and
benefits associated with becoming unemployed. The monetary benefits are clear. Workers
assigned to Welfare or to Workfare are offered a monetary benefit w > 0 for being unem-
ployed, while those assigned to Control are offered w = 0. Clearly, the unemployed under
Welfare or Workfare are not obliged to receive the money if they wish not to. However,
for simplicity, we assume that everyone entitled to an unemployment benefit claims it. In
terms of costs, the three unemployment systems considered in our experiment differ only
in the cost of effort e > 0 that the unemployed worker has to exert in order to receive
the unemployment benefit w under Workfare.11 Other than this, from a purely economic
perspective, the three interventions are equivalent in terms of costs.
Taking into account the economic costs and benefits, the asset equation for the expected
utility of an unemployed worker under each treatment is given by:
Workfare: rVU = (w − e) + a(VE − VU ) (7)
Welfare: rVU = w + a(VE − VU ) (8)
Control : rVU = a(VE − VU ) (9)
where a is the job acquisition rate and VE is the expected utility of an employed worker,
which equals V NE in equilibrium. We can now solve (4), (7), (8) and (9) simultaneously for
11Although the unemployed could eventually shirk also while he is performing the activity required under
Workfare, we assume that there is an opportunity cost of staying during the time of the activity, even doing
nothing. Moreover, in our experiment, at least one experimenter was present in the room, so the unemployed










a (w − e) + (w − e)(r + b)
r + a+ b
(10)
rV WelfareU =
a (w − e) + w(r + b)
r + a+ b
(11)
rV ControlU =
a (w − e)
r + a+ b
(12)
Substituting (10), (11) and (12) into (5) yields the Non-Shirking Condition for each
treatment:
Workfare: w > Φ + w − e, and (13)
Welfare: w > Φ + w (14)
Control : w > Φ (15)
where Φ = e + (r+a+b)eq . Note that, from a purely economic perspective, the (net)
unemployment benefit under Welfare is the highest of all the unemployment systems (i.e.
w > (w − e) and w > 0). Therefore, workers under Welfare should have the highest
incentives to shirk. This implies the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Welfare vs Workfare and Control): From a purely economic per-
spective, the productivity of workers under Welfare should be the lowest among the three
systems.
Hypothesis 2 (Workfare vs Control): From a purely economic perspective, if the
productivity of workers under Workfare is higher (respectively lower or equal) than the
productivity of workers under Control, it must be because the unemployment monetary
benefit w is lower (respectively higher or equal) than the cost of exerting effort e in the
activity under Workfare.
3 Experimental Design
To test these hypotheses, we developed a novel experimental design which consisted in
creating employment and unemployment in the field. In this section, we briefly describe
our design and we refer the reader to the Appendix, where we explain its particularities
with further detail.
We employed over 300 research assistants for a one-month period in two private univer-
sities located in Bogotá, Colombia, University of Rosario (U. Rosario) and University of
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Los Andes (U. Andes).12
The job was to code news on local politicians from the online archives of the two main
Colombian newspapers. We recorded daily individual productivity, measured as the number
of news correctly codified.
Workers were exposed to both positive and negative employment shocks, the sequence
and timing of which were unknown. Their productivity determined whether they remained
employed or became unemployed in the face of negative shocks depending on their magni-
tude.13
Unemployed subjects were assigned to either one of three treatments: Welfare, Workfare
or Control. In the Welfare treatment, unemployed workers received one third of the daily
salary in the form of an unconditional cash transfer. In the Workfare treatment, the unem-
ployed were required to work one third of the daily shift in order to receive the benefit.14
Finally, those assigned to the Control treatment did not receive any monetary benefit.
For identification purposes we implemented the experiment in two separate stages, with
the task described being the same in both. In one stage, we ran simultaneously the two
identical Control treatments in each university. This constitutes the benchmark of our
analysis and resembles a system in which no UBI is in place. In another stage we imple-
mented the two UBI treatments, one in each university and with all the employees within
each university receiving the same treatment. Welfare was implemented in U. Rosario and
Workfare in U. Andes. To avoid spillover and contagion between subjects assigned to dif-
ferent treatments within the same university, we implemented the UBIs interventions (i.e.
Welfare and Workfare) and the Control treatment with a one-year difference.
This design allows us to overcome several potential confounders that are intrinsic to
alternative designs. For instance, a random allocation of the UBI at the individual level
within universities, while probably making the subjects more comparable across treatments,
would have generated spillovers and contamination inasmuch as peers or classmates from
the same university are hired simultaneously to do the same job under different working
conditions (Miguel and Kremer, 2004).15 By allocating subjects to treatments across uni-
12Each participant was assigned to one of eighteen groups, according to their availability of time and their
university. Subjects who indicated availability in more than one slot were randomly allocated to one of these
slots. Once subjects were assigned to a group, they were not allowed to change it during the entire period of
the project. The distribution of groups was balanced across days, time of the day and newspaper to code.
Each group would have a work shift of 1.5 hours per day, two days per week, during four weeks. See Table
A.1 and appendix A.3 for a detailed description of the groups.
13Since we are interested in testing the effect of UBIs on productivity, we needed to make the probability
of becoming unemployed dependent on effort. If the probability of becoming unemployed was independent
on effort, there would not be a clear reason of why the UBI would affect productivity.
14The unemployment benefit was introduced in the most natural way possible. Employees were told that
given their commitment to work for the whole month, the unemployed were going to be offered the possibility
to receive a payment for the days they remained unemployed.
15Think of a situation in which two classmates meet and find out that they are both RAs in the same
project, but one has been offered money unconditionally when unemployed while the other had to do some
costly activity as a compensation for the money. Arguably, this would create an important confusion among
subjects that with sufficient propagation could have jeopardized the experiment or, at least, generated all
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versities we may in principle lose comparability. However, as it can be seen in Table 3, the
two populations are very similar in almost all the observable characteristics. More impor-
tant, our design allows us to control for the remaining unobserved heterogeneity that could
exist among students from the two universities. Indeed, we use a difference-in-differences
specification to compare the productivity differential of the two groups based in U. Rosario
(Welfare and Control) with the productivity differential of the two groups based in U.
Andes (Workfare and Control). Another alternative could have been to expose the same
subject to different UBIs at different moments. Although this type of design has proven
to be instrumental in other labor market field experiments (e.g. Bandiera et al. 2007),
we believe that in our particular setup such a design would have created a confusing and
excessively artificial setting, introducing considerable noise in the data.
For the recruitment, we sent an e-mail to all social sciences students announcing the
opening of temporal RA positions to work for a Research Group that we created for the
purpose of the experiment. The job announcement stated that, during the one month
period of duration of the project, the number of vacancies per day would vary and that their
daily employment status would depend on their work performance and on the shifting labor
demand. These two factors would in turn determine the final pay, and applicants were told to
expect a final payment varying between US$32 and US$90.16 The interested candidates had
to fill in a pre-formatted CV online, which we used to gather socio-demographic information
such us age, gender, residential address (from which we inferred the socioeconomic stratum),
GPA, current job, etc.
We did not interview the candidates. The first day of sessions was exclusively an induc-
tion day, when we explained the characteristics of the job and the contractual conditions.
Each working day lasted ninety minutes in total. Seventy minutes were used for coding and
the rest of the time was used to save the file, send it to us by e-mail (from the work account
we specially created for each of them) and filling in some questionnaires. Each session was
supervised by two research assistants randomly allocated across groups. The research as-
sistants would make sure that the session ran smoothly. They would set the computers up,
record attendance, answer questions about coding, administer questionnaires, etc.
Coders’ daily productivity was measured by the number of news correctly coded per day.
The quality of their work was controlled by our research assistants and the workers knew
this.17 After controlling for quality, the assistants would record the true productivity of
type of noise in our data.
16For a participant who would never lose his job and hence work for a maximum of 12 hours (1.5 hours
per shift × two shifts per week × four weeks) the corresponding expected final payment was between 2 and
6 times the hourly minimum wage. The incentive for taking up the job was then relatively large.
17On the induction day, coders were informed that the quality of their work was going to be monitored.
In principle, coders had incentives to cheat by adding fake entries into their files. To avoid this, we assigned
a team of six research assistants to control the quality of the entries. Every afternoon after the working day,
our assistants would randomly take at least 20% of the news coded by each coder, and control their quality
following a common evaluation protocol. They would check, for example, if the entry came from real news
or was invented, if the data imputed was consistent with the information in the news, etc.
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each coder and create a productivity ranking of coders per group and day. These rankings
were used to determine who would become unemployed (re-employed), in case of negative
(positive) shocks. Importantly, coders did not have access to these rankings until the last
day of work.
3.1 Sequence of the Experiment and Payment
The first day was an induction day with the purpose of providing a detailed explanation of
the particularities of the working scheme. During the induction, subjects received detailed
instructions on how to perform the task of coding. In addition, we told them that other
researchers were interested in collecting additional data, so as part of the work activities,
they would be asked to answer a set of questionnaires.18 Those who accepted the terms and
conditions of the job signed an informed consent and completed the first questionnaire.19
We created involuntary unemployment (shortage of vacancies) in all days except for the
first and last days, when we had full employment. Unemployment increased in the second
and sixth day, and decreased (i.e. vacancies were opened) during the rest of the project.
Table 1 shows the unemployment rate for each working day. On the days in which there
was a negative shock (i.e. an increase in the unemployment rate), the coders ranked last
according to their productivity in the previous day became unemployed. In turn, in cases in
which there was a positive demand shock (decrease in the unemployment rate), unemployed
subjects were informed via e-mail of the number of job vacancies to be opened the next day.
If they wanted to apply to fill one of such vacancies, they had to reply to that email stating
so to be considered eligible. New vacancies were filled according to applicants’ productivity
on their last day of employment. At the beginning of every working day, two assistants
would receive the subjects, check their coder’s ID and inform them about their condition as
employed or unemployed for that day. In order to be considered as part of the labor force,
all subjects had to attend their working session on time, even those who were unemployed
or had applied for a vacancy. If failed to do so (without any justified cause, such as illness),
they were considered to have withdrawn from the project.
The remuneration per 90 minutes of work was the market rate for research assistants
in the universities where the intervention took place. We paid subjects COP$ 14,250 (≈
US$ 8).20 This salary was over four times the minimum wage in Colombia for such working
shift. In addition, there was a bonus of COP$ 40,000 (≈ US$ 22), for the best coder of
each group, i.e. the participant who codified the largest number of correct entries in any
given session. The maximum possible remuneration was US$ 90, earned by subjects who
18Subjects were informed that their answers to these questionnaires were going to be treated anonymously
and would only be used for academic purposes.
19Only one subject out of the 396 who came to the induction day, did not sign the informed consent,
deciding not to take the job after the job conditions were explained.
20At the time of the experiment, the average hourly salary of a research assistant was COP$ 10,300 (≈
US$ 5.8).
10
came to the induction day (US$ 6), were employed during the eight working days (US$ 8
× 8 days = US$ 64) and won the bonus for best coder of his/her group (US$ 20). The
minimum possible remuneration of someone who participated in the project over the whole
period was US$ 32 if the person was assigned to a treatment with an UBI, and US$ 14 is
he/she was assigned to the Control. In order to minimize attrition, we paid the last day of
the project. Additionally, subjects who withdraw from the project were entitled to request
only half of the money earned by the last day they showed up to work, and this was paid
too on the last day of the project.
3.2 Interventions
As mentioned, we implemented three different experimental interventions. The Control
treatment, without any UBI, and two treatments designed to mimic the two main existing
UBIs (Welfare and Workfare).
The amount of the unemployment benefit was identical in the two UBI treatments and
equivalent to a third of the daily shift salary of the employed. This is of course an abstraction
of the real world UBIs, in which unemployment compensations vary, even within countries,
according to several characteristics of the unemployed like the spell of unemployment. While
we do not think that abstracting from this variation is relevant for our experiment, we
did make an effort to replicate other features of the actual implementation of UBIs. For
instance, when applying for the benefit in reality, unemployed individuals have to fulfill
some requirements, including signing up, filling in paperwork, and showing up regularly
at some administrative office (usually to fill in additional paperwork). We had a similar
procedure in our two treatments: the unemployed who wanted to receive the benefit had
to show up every working day at the time and place of work. If assigned to Welfare the
unemployed could leave immediately after filling in some short questionnaires, which would
grant him the benefit for that day (although payable at the end of the project).21 If assigned
to Workfare, the unemployed could choose whether to complete the ancillary task necessary
to receive the compensation for that day or to leave, which meant turning the compensation
down.22 In any case the unemployed had to show up and sign an attendance sheet. Failing
to do so would be equivalent to quit the job altogether and stop being considered part of
the labor force (i.e. being unable to apply for a position when new vacancies were opened).
For comparability, unemployed coders in the Control treatment were also required to
show up every working day at the time and place of work if they wanted to be considered
21We used the questionnaires to measure various psychological traits that we use to test the mechanisms
behind our main result.
22The task, which lasted 30 minutes, was to place letters in envelopes and paste on them randomly
assigned (real) postal addresses. We manipulated the content of the letter in two sub-treatments. A Charity
sub-treatment used letters that asked for donations to a social NGO. A Placebo sub-treatment used letters
to publicize the business of a local private firm. While the existence of these sub-treatments within the
Workfare treatment does not affect the incentives exploited for this paper, these data will be used in
subsequent companion papers.
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part of the labor force. They were invited to leave immediately after filling some short
questionnaires. This process did not entitled them any money.
4 Sample and Data
After releasing our call for research assistants we received 732 applicants who were available
to work on the time slots we opened. We recruited 470 on a first-come first-served basis,
100 for Welfare, 200 for Workfare, and 170 for Control (of which 90 in U. Rosario and 80
in U. Andes).23
Since the experiment lasted a month, there was some attrition. Table 2 summarizes
the size of the sample for the different treatments across different stages. For instance, of
the 470 recruited (who were sent a confirmation email stating that their application was
successful), 84% showed up on the first day, when we explained in detail the characteristics
and conditions of the job. In spite of the fact that all of those who attended the induction
(except for only one applicant) “accepted the job” and signed a consent form, 23% of them
did not show up to the first day of work. In all, we started the project with 307 subjects.
Of the starters, about 19% in the UBI treatments and 47% in the Control treatment
dropped out between the first and the last day of activities. They did so by not showing up
to the place and time of work in at least one working day, regardless of their employment
status.24 However, these dropouts are not likely to significantly bias our results: On the one
hand, the attrition rates reported in the last row of Table 2 are not significantly different
between Welfare and Workfare, and between Control in U. Rosario and Control in U.
Andes.25 Most importantly, Panel A of Table 4 reports the average productivity on the
first day of work of those who dropped out and those who remained in the project until
the last day, by university and treatment. It also reports the difference in the average first
day-productivity between the dropouts and the finalizers. Those who dropped out were in
all cases significantly less productive than those who remained in the project. This rules
out the possibility that the observed treatment differences in productivity are driven by the
fact that those who dropped out in Workfare were the most productive workers and those
who dropped out in Welfare were the least productive ones. Additionally, in section 5 we
show that if we restrict the sample to those subjects who stay throughout the project, our
results hold.
The sample composition in terms of baseline individual characteristics, psychological
measures and starting productivity is reported in Table 3. The information about the indi-
23As mentioned, in Workfare we implemented two different sub-treatments that had to do with the contents
of the letter to be put in envelopes. We recruited 100 subjects per sub-treatment.
24This difference is not surprising as it made little sense for the unemployed to show up to work without
the incentive of receiving a monetary compensation in the Control treatment. However, for comparability
we had to keep the design across treatments identical.
25The p-value of the t-test of mean differences in the attrition rate across universities is 0.38 for the UBI
treatment and 0.67 for the control.
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vidual characteristics (Panel A) was gathered from the pre-formatted CV which applicants
had to fill in online in order to apply for the job. The psychological measures (Panel B)
were collected from the questionnaires that the participants filled in during different stages
of the project. The initial productivity (Panel C) is that recorded on the first day of work
for each individual. The students recruited in each university were quite similar in most
respects. We see initial differences between the two groups only in terms of gender, and
average socioeconomic status of the coders.26 The sample from U. Rosario displays a larger
prevalence of female coders relative to U. Andes in both, the control stage and the UBI
stage. In turn, coders from U. Andes are relatively wealthier in both stages. We control for
these variables throughout our empirical analysis.
In contrast, we see no initial differences across universities in terms of age, average GPA,
whether the student currently has another job, or whether the major of study is related to
economics (i.e. economics, finance or business) versus other social sciences. Importantly,
within universities there are no significant differences in any of the individual characteristics
across stages, which provides support to our empirical strategy. In addition, as indicated
by Panels B and C, we do not observe differences across universities either in terms of the
psychological traits that we collected at the start of the experiment, or the innate ability to
perform the task (as measured by the productivity in the first day). In Panel B we focus on
two psychological variables: self-esteem and job satisfaction. Self-esteem measures subjects’
overall evaluation of own’s worthiness or value. It was measured using a validated Spanish
version of the Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), one of the most widely-used
self-esteem measures in social science research.27 To measure job satisfaction we used a
modified version of Macdonald and MacIntyre (1997) Job Satisfaction Scale.28
The fact that the students recruited in both universities are overall very similar in terms
of a large number of characteristics is not surprising since both universities are private, offer
roughly the same majors within the social sciences, target students from the same back-
grounds, and are among the best universities in Colombia. The fact that the average initial
productivity does show significant differences within universities and across treatments is
precisely one of our main findings, as will be clear in the next section.
26Neighborhoods in Bogotá have a score from 1 to 6 (called strata) which is used to price discriminate
the tariff charged for public services. People who live in strata 5 and 6 (and to some extent 4) subsidize
the utilities of those living in strata 1 and 2. Real state and rent prices are positively correlated with
this stratification. Therefore, the income level of a household is highly correlated to the stratum of her
neighborhood of residence. Hence the use of this proxy in the absence of objective household income or
consumption data. Importantly, the stratum is not self-reported. On the contrary, in the pre-formatted CV
that applicants completed online, they reported their address of residence. We looked up each address on a
map to determine the respective stratum.
27The RSES is a compound of ten items answered on a four-point scale ranging from strongly agree to
strongly disagree. The Spanish version of the RSES scale was validated by Martin-Albo et al. (2007) and
has been shown to have satisfactory levels of internal consistency and temporal stability in a population of
Spanish university students. We only changed some few words so that the scale better matched Colombian
use of the Spanish language.
28We shortened and adapted this scale to the specificities of the job. The resulting scale is compounded
of six items, answered on a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
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5 Results
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether and how UBIs in general and the type of
UBI in particular affect the productivity of workers. Our measure of productivity is the
number of news correctly coded by each subject in each working session. Figures 1a and
1b show the average daily productivity by university in the control stage and in the UBI
stage respectively. In turn, Panel B of Table 4 shows the average productivity of the entire
working period across stages and universities for the whole sample and for the sample that
excludes the subjects who dropped out between the first and the last days of work. Note
that within each university the productivity of coders is higher in the UBI stage than in
the control. This suggests that having an unemployment benefit, regardless of its type,
increases workers’ productivity.
In addition, Figure 1a shows that in most working days of the control stage, the average
productivity of the employees in U. Andes is slightly higher than in U. Rosario, Figure 1b,
on the contrary, shows that in the UBI stage there is a swap in the productivity advantage
and coders of U. Rosario (who worked under a Welfare scheme) are more productive than
their peers at U. Andes (under Workfare) in most working days. Indeed, according to Table
4 the average productivity of the entire working period in the control stage is about 8 less
news per day in U. Rosario compared to U. Andes. In contrast, the average productivity
of the entire working period in the UBI stage is about 16 more news per day in U. Rosario
(Welfare) compared to U. Andes (Workfare). This observation, which is robust to looking
at the entire sample or at the sample net of dropouts, implies that the productivity gain
obtained in the Welfare scheme is higher (24 news so) than that obtained in the the Workfare
scheme, a finding that is more striking given the fact that the average productivity of the
first day of work does not significantly differ across universities in neither stage (see Panel
C of Table 3).
We now investigate further these two findings, namely that the presence of any UBI
stimulates productivity and that this stimulus is larger in schemes with unconditional com-
pensations. For this purpose, we estimate a difference-in-differences model that, controlling
for individual characteristics, allows us to identify both the differential productivity of each
UBI relative to the Control treatment, as well as the additional productivity differential
that stems from being under a particular UBI relative to the oder. The later is indeed our
main interest: we want to shed light on which unemployment compensation scheme (and
for what reasons) is more productivity enhancing and hence has potentially larger economic
benefits.
Recall, however, that our experiment follows a between-subjects design and hence each
subject is either treated (by working under one of the two UBIs) or non-treated (by working
under a scheme with no compensation). That is, to avoid spillovers and contagion between
treated and control groups within each university, we do not have a panel of subjects some
of which were first non-treated and then treated. However, recall from Table 3 that the
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samples of coders are balanced both across universities and, within them, across stages.
This is so in terms of a large set of observable characteristics, including for instance initial
self-esteem and initial productivity. This ensures that any result we may find with this
approach is solely driven by the effect of the UBI treatments.29 Pooling the data across
individuals and working dates we estimate the following regression model:
yitus = α+ β1Rosariou + β2UBIs + β3(Rosario× UBI)us + δ′Xitus + εitus (16)
where yitus is the productivity of individual i on working session t, in university u and
experimental stage s; Rosariou is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for subjects in
U. Rosario and zero for participants in U. Andes; UBIs is a dummy variable that takes
value of 1 for subjects who participated in the UBI stage and zero for those in control stage;
and Xitus is a vector of controls that include gender, socio-economic stratum fixed effects
and day fixed effects (hence the t subscript). These fixed effects account, respectively, for
any omitted characteristic that is common to all individuals with the same socioeconomic
background and for any aggregate shocks that may affect all subjects on any working day
(including potential learning over time). Finally note that the interaction between Rosario
and UBI picks up the subjects who were exposed to the Welfare treatment in the UBI
stage.
Importantly, our design allows us to identify not only the effect on productivity of the
workers who experienced unemployment (i.e. a direct effect), but also to study whether,
in anticipation of the possibility of losing one’s job, the presence of an UBI affects the
productivity of workers who never become unemployed (i.e. an indirect effect). Thus, in
addition to estimate equation (16) on the entire experimental sample, we estimate it on
the subsample of returners (by looking at their productivity on the day they went back to
work) and on the subsample of those who kept their job throughout the experiment (which
we call “always employed”).
Table 5 reports the regression results for the three samples of interest. To investigate
the extent to which the individual characteristics may confound the estimates, the odd
columns include no controls and the even columns include the full set of controls in Xitus.
The estimated coefficients are remarkably stable when the controls are included.30 Columns
1 and 2 report the results from estimating equation (16) on the entire sample of subjects.
29In all the regressions we control for the characteristics that turned out to be significantly different
across universities. In particular, we include a dummy variable that captures the gender of the coder as
well as stratum fixed effects that correct for any heterogeneity across subjects that is correlated with their
socioeconomic status.
30To address any potential inference problem due to serial correlation, we report henceforth results using
robust standard errors, clustered at the group level. We cluster at the group level because each subject
was competing with the rest of participants within his group when it came to decide who would be laid
off. If subjects talked to each other after a coding session they could roughly estimate the effort-minimizing
productivity level needed to keep the job.
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First, note that the estimated coefficient associated with the U. Rosario dummy (β1 in
the equation) is not significant. This is equivalent to saying that the average productivity
of coders across universities does not differ in the control stage.31 Second, the estimated
coefficient associated with the UBI stage dummy (β2) is positive and significant, suggesting
that, within U. Andes, coders who worked in the UBI stage (i.e. under the Workfare
treatment) are about 23 news more productive than their counterparts assigned to the
Control treatment. Third, the increase in productivity in the UBI relative to the control
stage is larger in U. Rosario. Indeed, workers under Welfare coded almost 24 news in excess
of the extra news coded by workers under Workfare (β3). Note that the magnitudes and
significance of these figures are robust to adding the day fixed effects and the individual
controls. Recall that the latter include a gender dummy and dummies that capture the
socioeconomic status of each coder.
Hypothesis 1 in Section 2 states that under a purely economic perspective, the observed
productivity under the Welfare treatment should be the lowest among our experimental
groups. Our results reject this hypothesis. In fact, the estimate of β3 implies the opposite:
the productivity of workers under Welfare is the highest. We consider this to be the main
result of the paper, namely that the productivity of workers under the Welfare UBI is the
highest among the three unemployment compensation systems that we examine.
Hypothesis 2 compares the effect of being assigned to the Workfare UBI vs. being in
the Control treatment. According to it, if the productivity of those assigned to Workfare
is higher than the one observed for the Control group, it must be that the unemployment
benefit is lower than the cost of the effort required to be entitled to the benefit (i.e. w < e).
Our estimate of β2, which is positive and significantly different from zero, suggests this to
be the case.
There are two possible channels through which the unemployment benefit system may
affect the productivity of workers. There is on the one hand the direct effect, or the effect
of being exposed to unemployment under the different schemes. On the other hand, the
indirect effect is the incentive that the compensation scheme has on the workers that remain
employed by making them anticipate the costs that they would face if being laid off. We
explore the relative importance of these two channels in columns 3 through 6 of Table 5.
Given the results presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, if the direct effect is empiri-
cally relevant then it must the case that workers who have experienced unemployment are
more productive when they return to work if they are employed under an UBI scheme (in
particular under Welfare) than under a scheme with no unemployment compensation. To
see this we estimate equation (16) on the subsample of subjects who were unemployed and
then returned to work. To make our test more stringent, we focus on their productivity
on the day of return. Column 3 provides some weak support for the existence of such di-
31The constant can be interpreted as the average news coded in U. Andes during the control stage, which
in this case is equivalent to almost 42 news. β1, represents the additional news coded in U. Rosario.
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rect effect, at least for the subjects working under Welfare: On the return day, formerly
unemployed re-hired workers under Workfare are not more productive than their Control
counterparts in U. Andes (the estimate of β2 is not significant). However, re-hired workers
under Welfare coded almost 18 news more than similar subjects in the other experimental
groups (see the estimate of β3). Column 4 confirms that this finding is robust to adding
individual level controls.32
We now study the empirical relevance of the indirect effect. To that end we estimate
equation (16) on a sample restricted to the subjects that did not lose the job at any stage
in the experiment, and hence that we call the always employed. The results, reported in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, are very similar to those obtained with the entire sample
(columns 1 and 2), but with somewhat larger magnitudes. Thus, among the workers who
remained always employed, those employed under an UBI are more productive than those
that are offered no unemployment benefit (about 27 news more productive in the estimation
that includes controls –column 6), and this additional productivity of the UBI workers is
larger (over 30 news larger relative to Workfare) for coders working under the Welfare UBI.
This result provides support for the indirect effect and suggests that workers can anticipate
the disutility of being unemployed without the need to actually experience unemployment,
and that the expected disutility is highest under Welfare thus making them exert higher
effort when employed.
The results presented so far suggest that the effects observed for the whole sample of
participants seem to be driven mainly by the behavior of the subsample of coders that
remained employed during the entire experiment, and hence by the indirect effect. First,
for the subsample of returners there is no evidence that workers under Workfare are more
productive than workers hired with no unemployment compensation. In contrast, this is
the case for the subsample of always employed. Second, while both in the subsample of
returners and in the subsample of the always employed the average productivity of the
coders hired under Welfare is larger than the productivity of the the coders working under
the other two unemployment schemes, this edge is 80 percent higher in the subsample of
the always employed relative to that of the returners, and it is statistically more significant.
5.1 Robustness
As discussed in section 4, due to the nature of the experiment, we experienced some attrition
between the first and the last working days. Recall from Table 2 that while attrition
rates do not differ statistically across universities in neither the UBI nor the control stage,
they are larger for workers assigned to the Control treatment.33 Recall also that in all
32Note that the estimated coefficient of the Rosario dummy in column 3 is negative and significant,
suggesting that the U. Rosario coders under Control are less productive than their U. Andes counterpart
when they return to work after being laid off. This nuance however disappears when the individual controls
are included (column 4).
33This is because, in order to keep the design comparable across treatments, unemployed workers in the
Control treatment had to show up every working day and sign their attendance, but did not receive a
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experimental groups, dropouts are significantly less productive than the sample of finalizer
subjects (Panel A of Table 4).34 This rises the concern that the results reported in Table 5
may be contaminated by attrition.
To rule out this possibility we replicate the analysis by considering only the subsample
of subjects who did not dropout, which we call “finalizers”, as they stayed until the last day
of the project. The results, reported in Table 6, are remarkably similar to our benchmark
results: i) Coders hired under an UBI scheme are on average more productive than coders
who are offered no unemployment compensation; ii) Relative to the Control coders, the
productivity gain of coders assigned to Welfare is larger than that of Workfare coders; iii)
There are no differences in the productivity of Control coders in U. Rosario and U. Andes
once individual controls and day fixed effects are accounted for. Again these patterns are
mainly explained by the indirect effect or the expectations about the unemployment condi-
tions of workers who do not lose their job (columns 5 and 6). Indeed, the only substantive
difference with Table 5 is that on the day they returned to work, formerly unemployed
under Welfare are not significantly more productive than workers of other unemployment
schemes (columns 3 and 4).35
6 Potential Mechanisms
6.1 The Psychological Costs of Unemployment
As shown above, our main findings contradict the standard economic predictions, as summa-
rized by Hypothesis 1. In this section we discuss a potential explanation that can account
for this contradiction. We do so by introducing psychological features to the standard
economic model presented in section 2.
While the standard economic model abstracts from the psychological costs of unem-
ployment, there is extensive evidence on the negative effect that unemployment has on the
psychological well-being of the unemployed (see Darity and Goldsmith, 1996 for a review).
If the psychological costs involved in each experimental intervention differ from each other,
this could potentially explain the sharp productivity differences observed in the data.
What are the psychological costs of unemployment and how are these costs likely to vary
across each intervention? The literature of psychology and behavioral economics identifies
three major sources of psychological costs of unemployment: idleness, shame and social
stigma. As Jahoda (1981, 1988) points out, being idle while unemployed is psychologically
destructive because the individual is deprived of the “byproducts of the work environment”.
Employment implies regularly shared experiences and contact with people outside the core
family; links individuals to goals and purposes that transcend their own; defines aspects
compensation in exchange.
34This is because low productivity implies a higher probability of being laid off after negative demand
shocks and a lower probability of being hired back after positive shocks.
35The p-value of the estimated β3 in the model that includes controls (column 4) is 0.106.
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of personal status and identity; and finally, employment enforces activity. In words of
Jahoda (1982), “even unsatisfactory employment is preferable to the absence of work”
(Cited in Darity and Goldmisdt, 1996, p. 124). Since this cost is associated with pure
idleness, there are only two interventions in which it may in principle exist: Welfare and
Control. The monetary compensation offered in Welfare should somehow compensate for
this cost, so if this psychological cost was the only one present in our experiment, we should
have observed productivity under Control being higher than productivity under Welfare.
However, productivity under Welfare more than doubles productivity under Control in our
experiment, which suggest that the cost of idleness pointed out by Jahoda is not the key
factor (or at least not the sole factor) driving our results.
The second source of psychological cost comes from the shame associated with unem-
ployment. Shame is an overwhelming and unpleasant emotion associated with feelings of
worthlessness, inferiority, and a damaged self-image (Ausubel, 1955). The occurrence of
shame amongst unemployed people was described by numerous scholars, especially for the
case of white collar workers (see for example Fineman, 1983). This is particularly relevant
for the population in our experiment, that consists of well-educated subjects who become
unemployed because of their low productivity compared to their peers.
The third possible source of psychological cost is the social stigma of being unemployed
(Walsgrove, 1987). Social stigma can be defined as a disapproval of personal characteristics
or beliefs that are against cultural norms. Jobless people usually feel at fault, and are often
stigmatized as being lazy or useless (Letkemann, 2002), all factors that are known to affect
self-worth.
It is plausible that the unemployed in our project may have experienced some degree of
shame or stigma. But to what extend could these psychological effects have differed across
treatments? If the psychological costs caused by shame or stigma were higher under Welfare
than under either Workfare or no UBI, and high enough to outweigh the monetary benefits
of Welfare, then they could provide a plausible explanation of the productivity differences
we observe across treatments. We illustrate this by revisiting the simple economic model of
section 2 and examine to what extent Hypotheses 1 and 2 change when the aforementioned
psychological costs are incorporated in the model.
First, we incorporate a psychological cost of being idle, γ > 0, to the costs of being
unemployed under Welfare (see section 2, equation 14) and under Control (equation 15),
since in both these systems the unemployed is idle.36
Second, above and beyond the cost of being idle, recent literature of behavioral eco-
nomics reports evidence that people feel more comfortable when they pay a price for their
mistakes or misbehavior than when they do not. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
show that introducing a monetary fine for late-coming parents in day-care centers increased
36Note that there are no reasons to believe that the unemployed assigned to Workfare suffer from the
psychological cost of being idle, because they can pursue an activity).
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the number of late-coming parents significantly. It is as if the fine washes out the shame
or guilt parents may feel when they misbehave. In our setting, the costly activity required
in Workfare can be understood as a fine the unemployed are willing to pay to wash out
their guilt or shame of being of low relative productivity. This possibility is clearly not
present under the Welfare intervention, where the unemployed not only is prevented from
the possibility to pay a fine to wash out any negative feelings associated with their low pro-
ductivity, but on top of that, he receives money unconditionally. Based on this literature,
we introduce an additional psychological cost λ > 0 to being unemployed under Welfare.37
Thus, taking into account these psychological costs referred to in the literature, we revisit
the non-shirking conditions specified in equations (13), (14) and (15) as follows:
Welfare: w > Φ + w − λ− γ, (13′)
Workfare: w > Φ + w − e, and (14′)
Control : w > Φ − γ, (15′)
Our main empirical finding is that workers under Welfare are more productive than
under Workfare, who in turn are more productive than workers assigned to Control. This
implies that, ceteris paribus, the cost of being unemployed under Welfare is higher than the
cost of being unemployed under Workfare (i.e. −w+γ+λ > e−w, or γ+λ > e), and that
the cost of being unemployed under Workfare is higher than the cost of being unemployed
under Control (i.e. e − w > γ, or e > γ + w). These two conditions together imply that
γ + λ > γ + w, or λ > w. Hence, our results imply that the additional psychological
cost of being unemployed under Welfare (i.e. λ > 0) must not only exist, but it must be
substantially high as to outweigh the monetary benefit w offered in the two UBIs.
Importantly, the proposed psychological mechanism is supported by the data. Using
the standardized psychological questionnaire applied to the subjects at different moments
of the experiment, we look at how the initial “self-esteem”, which according to Table 3 is
balanced across treatments, is affected by the different compensation schemes. Specifically,
in Table 7 we compare the change in self-esteem between the first day of work until day 6
(when the last unemployment shock took place) of the coders who remained unemployed
through days 2 to 6, to that of the coders who have not lost their job within that period.
Again, for robustness we do so for both, the entire sample of workers (Panel A) and for
the subsample of finalizers (Panel B).38 We find that, while the change in self-esteem is not
37Note that the there are no reasons to believe that the unemployed assigned to Workfare suffer from
shame/guilt of being paid for doing nothing (because, indeed, they are paid only if they do something).
38Because comparisons are made within universities and treatments, and for subsamples of employed and
unemployed, we are left with relatively few observations within each bean. Thus, in Table 7 we report the
results of the Mann-Withney test. However, all these results are however robust to using the standard T-test
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significantly different across universities and treatments for neither the unemployed or the
employed, experiencing unemployment does imply a drop in self-esteem, albeit only under
Welfare. This drop in self-esteem could in principle be associated to shame or stigma. While
distinguishing between these two effects is out of the scope of this paper, we conjecture that
what we observe is more likely to correspond to shame than to stigma. Indeed, even when
some degree of stigma presumably exists in both UBIs, the feeling of shame is more likely to
be present under Welfare, where the unemployed were offered an unconditional monetary
benefit for being the lowest productive coders. Moreover, it has been shown how welfare
stigma can lead to the perpetuation of welfare use (Page, 1984), due to its effect on self-
esteem.39 In principle, a Workfare UBI can mitigate such effect by offering the unemployed
the chance to contribute with their effort and time to an activity with a clear purpose.
Hence, the fact that we observe an actual drop in self-esteem only when the unemployed
is assigned to Welfare, not only provides evidence on the existence of λ > 0, but it also
suggests that this extra psychological cost comes from the experience of shame.
Arguably, in our experiment the unemployed had the chance to avoid these psychological
costs by choosing not to receive the benefit. In principle, the unemployed were free to do so,
although nobody in our experiment actually chose that option. This suggests that the sole
fact of being part of the Welfare system was enough to affect their self-esteem, and coders
did not do anything to avoid it but to work hard when they were employed. Declining to
receive the benefits at the end of the project seemed not to be a device used to protect
self-esteem. One possible explanation for this behavior could be that once the self-esteem
was damaged, rejecting or accepting the benefit would not restore it.40
6.2 Alternative mechanisms
We have shown that the presence of psychological costs can explain the observed differ-
ences in productivity across experimental groups. Nevertheless, there may be alternative
explanations also consistent with our findings. In this subsection we explore these.
The first potential alternative mechanism is reciprocity, in the form of gift exchange.
It could be that the unemployed in Welfare felt treated nicely because they were offered
money for doing nothing and they reciprocated with high effort when they were employed.
Our data do not seem to support this mechanism. One would expect that coders who
experienced unemployment are those more willing to reciprocate, because are they have
experienced the special treatment. However, as we have already shown, most of the dif-
ference in productivity between treatments comes from the coders who remained employed
of differences in means.
39Social psychologist make an important characterization of shame that distinguish it from guilt, regret
and embarrassment: shame is the only negative emotion that involves a drop in self-esteem (see Welten,
Breugelmans and Zeelenberg, 2013). So the drop of self-esteem we observe is a necessary, though perhaps
not sufficient, condition for the existence of shame.
40We acknowledge that in real life scenarios, however, some people would never claim an unemployment
benefit, precisely to avoid the psychological costs we just showed existed in our experimental setting.
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throughout the duration of the project (i.e. the indirect effect), and who in principle have
less reasons to reciprocate. If anything, they could only reciprocate good intentions. Figure
2 shows the daily average productivity for the employees who remained always employed
in the Welfare treatment in U. Rosario and in the Workfare treatment in U. Andes. While
there are no differences in the performance at the beginning of the project, after the first
day of work subjects in Welfare perform better than those in Workfare. Moreover, the fact
that the productivity wedge disappears on the last day of activities (mainly through a large
drop in the productivity of the Welfare subjects) is not consistent with the reciprocity story.
Indeed, recall that in the last day of the project there were vacancies available for every-
one, so everyone who was unemployed and applied came back to work. If it was true that
the motivation to reciprocate was higher under Welfare than under Workfare, we would
expect productivity under Welfare to increase even further in the last day. We observe the
opposite.
Importantly, the closure of the productivity gap in the last working day, via a drop in
the productivity of the Welfare coders, confirms that the effect in productivity during the
project can be attributed entirely to the treatments. Indeed, in the last day the incentives
were exactly the same in the two treatments because there was no possibility of becoming
unemployed.
The second mechanism we consider has to do with job satisfaction. From a purely
economic perspective (i.e. without taking into account the psychological costs), the cost
of unemployment under Workfare is higher than under Welfare because it requires some
positive effort in exchange of the same compensation. Thus, coders under Workfare could
have experienced higher pressure to perform well than those under Welfare, which in turn
could have translated into a worse performance.41 If this was true, then job satisfaction
would be lower for workers under Workfare.
Using a measure of job satisfaction, collected in various moments of the intervention
with standardized questionnaires, we test the validity of this mechanism. The results are
reported in Table 8. We find that workers are equally satisfied across treatments and
that this is so both, at the beginning and at the end of the experiment (day 1 and day
8). Moreover, this is true independent of whether we look at all the workers employed on
the days we measured job satisfaction (Panel A), or at the sample of workers who never
experienced unemployment (Panel B). Hence, we rule out differential psychological stress
as a possible explanation of our results.
A third alternative explanation concerns treatment differences in group collusion. Bandiera
et al. (2005) show that workers may tacitly collude as a group and reduce their individual
productivity, as they internalize the externality of their performance on their colleagues. If
the social preferences/ties in the Workfare group were stronger than in the Welfare one,
this could be the reason for the observed productivity differences. However, note that in our
41See Oswald et al (2011) for evidence on how happiness affects productivity.
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setting, an altruistic worker who wants to increase the expected income of their colleagues
will choose to exert zero effort and when unemployed, he will choose not to apply to fill
in the new vacancies. Therefore, social ties could only be a reason for dropping out (or
stay in unemployment throughout the project), but does not explain differences in produc-
tivity. Recall from Table 2, that we do not observe differences in the dropout rate across
universities. So, we rule out this alternative explanation.
Finally, we explore whether the behavior of the unemployed when it comes to apply
for new vacancies is consistent with our results on productivity and with the psychological
mechanism that, we argue, explains them. We thus look at the application rates across
treatments. Focusing on Panel A of Table 9, which looks at the application rate in working
day 7 within the two UBI treatments, we find that subjects under Welfare apply on average
less than under Workfare.42 This is robust to including the usual individual controls (column
2). At first, this may seem at odds with the mechanism proposed: If the cost of being
unemployed under Welfare is indeed so high, coders would not only try to avoid it working
hard (our main finding), but they would also apply more aggressively when new vacancies are
opened. However, the results of Table 9 are perfectly consistent with the main mechanism
put forward, namely that an unconditional monetary benefit increases productivity through
its negative effect on self-esteem. It is precisely this negative effect on self-esteem what
may discourage people to apply for new positions.43 We test this conjecture by looking
at the effect on the probability of applying to new vacancies on day 7 on the interaction
between Welfare and the change in self-esteem. As shown in columns 3 and 4 (without
and with controls, respectively) of Panel A, the interaction term is positive and significant.
This means that the unemployed under Welfare has a lower probability of applying to a
new vacancy if his self-esteem drops. Hence, Welfare acts as a self-esteem underminer.
Conversely, Workfare may be understood as a self-esteem buffer.
Interestingly, when we estimate the same regression for the application rate for the
vacancies opened for day 8 (the last day of work, when there is full employment), we
observe that neither the Welfare treatment nor its interaction with the change in self-
esteem matters anymore (see Panel B of Table 9). This result is consistent with the theory
of Kőszegi (2006): the only way in which self-esteem can be damaged further is when the
unemployed apply for a job unsuccessfully.44 This certainly is a possibility in day 7, but
it is not in day 8, when the unemployed do not compete for jobs anymore since there is
full-employment. For this reason, self-esteem will not be harmed anymore, and hence the
42As will become clear, we focus on day 7 applications because we want to examine how applications
interact with the change is self-esteem, which is measured on the first and the sixth day of work.
43The emotional distress of joblessness may create a“discouragement” effect is consistent with Seligman’s
(1975) idea of learn helplessness.
44This is what psychologist call situation avoidance: ‘action (or inaction) that purposely avoids the acqui-
sition of economically valuable information relating to one’s personal characteristics - even when the cost of
acquiring such information appears to be zero” (see Andolfatto, Mongrain, Myers, 2009). If the individual
cares about how he views himself, and acquisition of information affects this view, then he will try to protect
his self-esteem by avoiding the situation.
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unemployment institution does not affect the application rate.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a field experiment to study, for the first time, the effect of unemployment
benefits institutions on individual productivity. Our experimental design allows us to mea-
sure workers’ productivity under the two most widely used unemployment benefit schemes
(workfare and welfare) and under a situation without unemployment benefit.
Contrary to the conventional economics perspective, we observe that an unconditional
unemployment benefit makes workers more productive than a conditional compensation
scheme, and that both schemes make workers more productive than having no unemploy-
ment benefit. We provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the difference in
productivity comes from the fact that workers dislike being paid while idle when they are
unemployed. This situation affects their self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or the
stigma associated with an unconditional monetary benefit. These psychological costs act
as a powerful non-monetary incentive which induces workers to work harder to avoid un-
employment.
Although self-esteem is conceived to be a stable and enduring personality treat of the
individual, it may be altered by major life changes or traumatic events (Gergen, 1978;
Akerlof and Yelen, 1985). Our findings provide clear cut evidence that unemployment can
affect self-esteem in a considerable way, even in a short-period of time, and in a situation in
which working is not the main activity of the person. Hence, our results can be understood
as a lower bound of the potential effects of real life unemployment institutions on the
psychology of the unemployed, and on productivity.
Also importantly, our findings imply that an institution such as Workfare can act as
self-esteem protector by keeping the unemployed actively working for a purpose. However,
this comes at the cost of a lower productivity.
Care should be taken in generalizing the results of this experiment to other situations
and people. Although using a real job in a natural environment gives higher external validity
than an artificial task in a lab setting, we still acknowledge that our population is far from
being representative of all the labor force. However, our sample is arguably representative
of an important segment of the world population who currently suffers from unemploy-
ment, namely well-educated youth. According to the European Commission (2013), youth
unemployment rate in Europe is more than twice as high as the adult one. The chances
for a young unemployed person of finding a job are low and when young people do work,
their jobs tend to be less stable. Moreover, the unemployment among youth with academic
degrees is an increasing problem both in developed and the developing countries. In Africa,
for example, young people with a university education have the highest unemployment rates
(African Economic Outlook, 2013).
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All in all, we believe that our analysis highlights important aspects that should not be
disregarded in the public policy discussion on social protection institutions. For instance,
welfare programs have been criticized for creating dependence and discouraging search for
new employment. Our findings suggest that such creation of dependence may be originated
and perpetuated due to a drop on self-esteem. Moreover, this psychological effect may serve
as a screening device, keeping low productivity workers out of the activity where they are
relatively less productive. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that if policy makers
care only about productivity, then a welfare-type UBI may be the way to go, as long as the
effect on self-esteem does not affect the supply of labor in other activities.
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Tables
Table 1: Sequence of unemployment shocks
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Shock − + + + − + +
% Unemployment Rate 0 60 55 45 35 60 50 0
Table 2: Recruitment and attrition
UBIs Control
Total
U. Andes U. Rosario U. Andes U. Rosario
Applicants 275 131 80 246 732
Recruited 200 100 80 90 470
Induction 163 65 79 89 396
Day 1 143 60 48 56 307
Day 8 114 51 24 31 220
Attrition Rate 20% 15% 49% 45%
Notes: Number of subjects in each category. The attrition rate is the share of subjects
who dropped by day 8 compared to the initial labor force in day 1.
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Table 3: Baseline sample differences across universities and treatments
Within U. Rosario Within U. Andes Across universities
Welfare Control Difference Workfare Control Difference UBI Control
(1) (2) (1)−(2) (3) (4) (3)−(4) (1)−(3) (2)−(4)
Panel A: Individual characteristics
Gender (1=female)b 0.63 0.57 0.06 0.45 0.40 0.05 0.18** 0.17*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Age 21.30 21.07 0.23 20.94 20.56 0.38 0.36 0.51
(0.25) (0.23) (0.34) (0.15) (0.23) (0.29) (0.28) (0.33)
Socioeconomic statusa 3.63 3.77 -0.13 4.50 4.34 0.16 -0.86*** -0.57**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19)
GPA (1 to 5 scale) 3.95 3.94 0.01 3.98 3.91 0.07 -0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Currently working (1=yes)b 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.17 -0.08 -0.01 -0.12*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Major (=1 econ. related)b 0.68 0.55 0.13 0.69 0.56 0.13 -0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
Panel B: Baseline psychological characteristics
Self-esteem (day 0) 35.79 34.65 1.14* 35.81 35.65 0.16 -0.02 -1.00
(0.42) (0.53) (0.67) (0.27) (0.45) (0.54) (0.50) (0.71)
Job satisfaction (day 1) 24.19 24.20 -0.01 23.85 24.13 -0.28 0.34 0.07
(0.46) (0.63) (0.77) (0.33) (0.51) (0.65) (0.59) (0.82)
Panel C: Initial productivity (day 1)
All sample (mean) 29.92 18.13 11.79*** 28.8 18.29 10.51*** 1.11 -0.16
(2.28) (1.44) (2.74) (1.36) (1.98) (2.61) (2.57) (2.41)
All sample (std. dev.)c 17.50 10.70 W0 =16.83*** 16.24 13.75 W0 =2.00 W0 =1.78 W0 =1.57
Notes: Definition of variables: Gender, Age and GPA are self-explanatory. Socioeconomic status: See section 4, in particular footnote 26. Currently
working: Answer to the question: Are you currently working? (1=Yes 0=No). Major: Answer to the question: What is your major o study?
(1=Economics, Business, Finance 0=Rest of social sciences). Self-esteem: See section 4, in particular footnote 27. Job satisfaction: See section 4, in
particular footnote 28. Productivity: See appendix A.2. a test of difference in means using Fisher’s exact test because variable is categorical. b test of
difference in means using χ (Pearson-Chi2) test because variable is dichotomous. c test of difference in variance using the statistic of Levene’s robust test
(statistic denoted by W0). The rest of the mean differences are checked using the t-test.*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Productivity differences across universities and treatments
Within U. Rosario Within U. Andes Across universities
Welfare Control Difference Workfare Control Difference UBI Control
(1) (2) (1)−(2) (3) (4) (3)−(4) (1)−(3) (2)−(4)
Panel A: Day one
Dropouts 17.22 12.12 5.10 22.96 14.50 8.46** -2.38 -5.74
(3.80) (1.27) (3.07) (1.81) (3.16) (3.49) (3.35) (3.87)
Finalizers 32.2 23.13 9.07** 30.30 22.08 8.22** 1.9 1.05
(2.48) (2.02) (3.56) (1.62) (2.21) (3.67) (2.94) (3.00)
Dropouts−finalizers -14.98** -11.01*** -3.96 -7.34** -7.58* 0.24 7.63 3.43
(6.08) (2.50) (6.18) (3.34) (3.85) (5.48) (6.79) (4.49)
Panel B: Average across days
All sample 80.82 34.22 46.61*** 64.63 41.95 22.67*** 16.19*** -7.74**
(4.30) (2.43) (5.35) (2.04) (2.99) (4.15) (4.19) (3.81)
Finalizers 82.85 37.58 45.27*** 66.93 46.75 20.18*** 16.92*** -9.18**
(4.41) (2.77) (5.83) (2.13) (3.42) (4.59) (4.34) (4.35)
Notes: t-test of difference in means in all cases. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 5: The effect of unemployment benefit institutions on the productivity of workers
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: Productivity
Sample: All Returners Always Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rosario -7.90 -4.24 -14.48* -10.80 -6.00 -4.92
(5.10) (3.15) (7.92) (7.63) (10.09) (8.88)
UBI 22.52*** 19.56*** 0.58 3.17 30.68*** 27.10**
(3.70) (3.82) (7.98) (9.02) (9.23) (9.75)
Rosario× UBI 24.09*** 23.39*** 17.64* 16.80* 29.30** 30.48**
(6.61) (4.98) (9.50) (9.39) (12.51) (10.72)
Constant 42.11*** 25.84*** 36.23*** 47.69*** 59.36*** 22.91*
(1.38) (4.94) (6.75) (15.64) (6.50) (11.31)
Individual controls X X X
Observations 1,242 1,242 133 133 602 602
R-squared 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.28
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. Control variables include
gender, socioeconomic stratum fixed effects and day fixed effects. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at
5%, * significant at 10%.
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Sample: All Returners Always Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rosario -9.18* -5.51 -15.36* -11.73 -6.00 -4.72
(5.20) (3.91) (8.60) (7.97) (10.09) (8.88)
UBI 20.18*** 19.91*** 0.17 2.22 30.68*** 27.10**
(4.26) (4.54) (7.94) (8.89) (9.23) (9.75)
Rosario× UBI 25.10*** 25.16*** 17.00 16.53† 29.30** 30.48**
(7.03) (5.66) (10.05) (9.67) (12.51) (10.72)
Constant 46.75*** 21.12** 36.23*** 44.96*** 59.36*** 22.91*
(1.67) (7.37) (6.75) (10.50) (6.50) (11.31)
Individual controls X X X
Observations 1,134 1,134 129 129 602 602
R-squared 0.08 0.26 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.28
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. Control variables include
gender, socioeconomic stratum fixed effects and day fixed effects. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%, † significant at 10.6%.
Table 7: Differences in the change of self-esteem across universities and treatments
Within U. Rosario Within U. Andes Across universities
Welfare Control Workfare Control UBI Control
(1) (2) (1)vs.(2) (3) (4) (3)vs.(4) (1)vs.(3) (2)vs.(4)
Panel A: All sample
Unemployeda -2.50 -0.50 U =-0.93 -0.67 -1.17 U =0.44 U =1.40 U =-0.76
(1.22) (2.40) (0.80) (0.91)
Employedb -0.47 0.27 U =-0.29 -0.43 -0.36 U =0.08 U =0.11 U =-0.34
(0.44) (0.87) (0.35) (0.62)
Unemp. vs. Emp. U =-1.88* U =0.07 U =-0.56 U =-0.92
Panel B: Finalizers
Unemployeda -3.33 -0.5 U =-1.33 -1.25 -1.00 U =-0.07 U =1.60 U =-0.24
(1.00) (2.40) (0.73) (3.00)
Employedb -0.47 0.27 U =-0.29 -0.43 -0.50 U =0.34 U =0.11 U =-0.62
0.47 (0.87) (0.35) (0.67)
Unemp. vs. Emp. U =-2.49** U =0.07 U =-1.16 U =-0.22
Notes: a Always unemployed between day 2 and 6. bAlways employed until day 6. U is the statistic of the Mann-Whitney test of difference
in means, performed in all cases because number of observations <30. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 8: Differences in Job Satisfaction across universities and treatments
Within U. Rosario Within U. Andes Across universities
Welfare Control Workfare Control UBI Control
(1) (2) (1)vs.(2) (3) (4) (3)vs.(4) (1)vs.(3) (2)vs.(4)
Panel A: All sample
Employed on day 1 24.19 24.20 -0.01 23.85 24.13 -0.28 -0.34 -0.07
(0.46) (0.63) (0.77) (0.33) (0.51) (0.65) (0.60) (0.82)
Employed on day 8 23.46 23.50 -0.04 23.17 22.82 0.35 -0.29 -0.68
(0.55) (0.62) (0.85) (0.34) (0.58) (0.81) (0.63) (0.87)
Panel B: Always employed
Always employeda 23.71 22.44 U =0.41 23.90 24.10 U =0.04 U =0.82 U =0.49
(day 1) (0.86) (1.60) (0.61) (1.30)
Always employeda 23.53 22.73 U =0.59 23.10 24.14 U =-0.11 U =-0.44 U =1.20
(day 8) (0.77) (1.09) (0.46) (0.83)
Notes: a Always employed sub-sample. U is the statistic of the Mann-Whitney test of difference in means, reported when the number
of observations <30. t-test of difference in means for all other cases. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 9: Effect of Welfare and the change in self-esteem in the probability of applying for
vacancies: UBI sample
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: Application dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Day 7
Welfare -0.296** -0.376** -0.298** -0.361**
(0.111) (0.142) (0.108) (0.145)
∆ Self-esteem -0.0145* -0.0106
(0.00717) (0.00774)
Welfare×∆ Self-esteem 0.0658*** 0.0616***
(0.0188) (0.0195)
Constant 0.563*** 0.717** 0.566*** 0.703**
(0.0482) (0.250) (0.0470) (0.237)
Observations 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.076 0.107 0.129 0.155
Panel B: Day 8
Welfare -0.0593 -0.0399 -0.0333 -0.0226
(0.0539) (0.0838) (0.0637) (0.108)
∆ Self-esteem 0.0455*** 0.0447**
(0.0134) (0.0149)
Welfare×∆ Self-esteem 0.00258 0.00756
(0.0263) (0.0306)
Constant 0.521*** 0.544 0.515*** 0.590
(0.0478) (0.421) (0.0520) (0.407)
Observations 74 74 74 74
R-squared 0.003 0.009 0.111 0.120
Individual controls X X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. Control
variables include gender, socioeconomic strata fixed effects and day fixed effects. ***
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
33
Figures
Figure 1: Daily average productivity across UBI treatments and controls
Figure 1a: Daily average productivity by university Figure 1b: Daily average productivity by university
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This appendix describes the recruitment process, the characteristics of the task, the pro-
ductivity measure and the sequence of the experiment in further detail. A copy of the
instructions on how to codify is available upon request to the authors.
A.1 Recruitment
We recruited students from University of Rosario and University of Los Andes, to work as
research assistants. We sent an e-mail to all social sciences students announcing the opening
of temporal positions to work with the Political Studies Research Group.45 Applicants had
to be willing to work one and a half hours, two days a week for a month. They could
choose to work Mondays and Wednesdays or Tuesdays and Thursdays, in the mornings or
in the afternoons. The job announcement also stated that the number of vacancies per
day would vary and that their final payment would depend on their work performance and
on the labor demand per day. Given this, applicants were told to expect a final payment
between US$32 and US$90.46 The announcement also made clear that availability during
the whole month period of the job was a necessary condition to be eligible. The interested
candidates had to fill in a pre-formatted CV online, where they had to select the time-slots
in which they were available to work. We gathered socio-demographic information such us
age, gender, residential address (from which we inferred the socioeconomic stratum), GPA,
current job, etc. Among all subjects available, we randomly selected and invited to the
induction day approximately 100 subjects per treatment/stage. For each recruited subject,
we created a non-photo badge with an ID and an e-mail account using that ID as user name
and password.47 Subjects were told that we would use that e-mail account to communicate
with them exclusively.48
A.2 Job Description and Productivity Measurement
As already mentioned, the job consisted in coding news about electoral practices of local
politicians from the online archives of the two most popular Colombian newspapers, El
Tiempo and El Espectador. The resulting dataset was used by Fergusson et al. (2013), who
needed a candidate-level dataset on media exposure to look at the electoral consequences
of the media exposing Congress candidates as having ties with illegal armed groups before
the elections relative to exposing them after the elections.
45This group was created in order to preserve the identity of the researchers involved in the project.
These researchers were never present in any of the sessions taking place in the universities to which they are
affiliated to. We did so to separate the employer-employee relationship from an eventual professor-student
one. Moreover, participants were told that the Political Studies Research Group was the employment agency
hired by the real users of the dataset.
46For a participant who would never lose his job and hence work for a maximum of 12 hours (1.5 hours
per shift × two shifts per week × four weeks) the corresponding expected final payment was between 2 and
6 times the hourly minimum wage. The incentive for taking up the job was then relatively large.
47Subjects were allowed to change the password to protect their privacy.
48We chose this procedure in order to provide anonymity especially for the unemployed who choose to
stay on the unemployment benefit. We wanted to avoid the unemployed to feel any pressure to eventually
apply for a new vacancy.
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Every working day, each coder was assigned a random list of politicians. The worker
had to search online for all news mentioning the names of the politicians in his list. For each
news found, he had to code information on a pre-formatted excel file. Every news coded
was a new row in the file. Coders had to follow a rigorous protocol which explained step
by step the search criteria as well as the type of information they had to record and how
to do so. At the end of each session, they had to save their excel files with all the entries
they recorded and label the file with their unique ID number and the day of work. In this
way, we were able to identify uniquely the output of each coder in each working day.
Each working day lasted ninety minutes in total. Seventy minutes were used for coding
and the rest of the time was used to save the file, send it to us by e-mail (from the work
account we specially created for each of them) and filling in some questionnaires.
Coders’ daily productivity was measured by the number of news correctly coded per day.
The quality of their work was controlled by our research assistants and the workers knew
this.49 After controlling for quality, the assistants would record the true productivity of
each coder and create a productivity ranking of coders per group and day. These rankings
were used to determine who would become unemployed (respectively re-employed), in case
of negative (respectively positive) shocks. Importantly, coders did not have access to these
rankings until the last day of work.
A.3 Groups and Place of Work
Coders were assigned to eighteen groups, according to their availability of time and their
university. Subjects who indicated availability in more than one slot were randomly allo-
cated to one of these slots. Once subjects were assigned to a group they were not allowed to
change it during the entire period of the project. The distribution of groups was balanced
across days, time of the day and newspaper to code. Half of the groups were allocated to
Mondays and Wednesdays and half to Tuesdays and Thursdays. Within each day, half of
the groups were in the morning and half in the afternoon. The average number of subjects
in the first day of work per group was around 17, ranging from a minimum of 11 subjects
to a maximum of 23. To avoid spillover and contagion between treated and control groups
within each university, we implemented the UBIs interventions (i.e. Welfare and Workfare)
and the intervention without UBI (i.e. Control) with a one-year difference. See Table A.1
for a detailed description of the eighteen groups.
Each group was randomly assigned to a distinct computer room. All computer rooms
had at least 25 PCs or laptops and internet connection. Each session was supervised by two
research assistants randomly allocated across groups. The research assistants would make
sure that the session ran smoothly. They would set the computers up, record attendance,
answer questions about coding, administer questionnaires, etc.
49On the induction day, coders were informed that the quality of their work was going to be monitored.
In principle, coders had incentives to cheat by adding fake entries into their files. To avoid this, we assigned
a team of six research assistants to control the quality of the entries. Every afternoon after the working day,
our assistants would randomly take at least 15% of the news coded by each coder, and control their quality
following a common evaluation protocol. They would check, for example, if the entry came from real news
or was invented, if the data imputed was consistent with the information in the news, etc.
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A.4 Sequence of the experiment
A.4.1 Induction day
The first day was an induction day with the purpose of providing a detailed explanation
of the particularities of the working scheme. Each subject received 75% of the salary of a
standard working session as a show-up compensation. During the induction, subjects were
reminded that their final remuneration would depend on their performance as coders, with
the minimum being US$ 32 and the maximum US$ 90 (2 and 6 times the hourly minimum
wage respectively for the maximum number of hours that they could work). They also
received a detailed explanation on the way their payments were going to be computed, a
description of the particularities of the job as well as the instructions on how to perform
the task of coding. In addition, we told them that other researchers were interested in
collecting additional data, so as part of the work activities, they would be asked to answer
a set of questionnaires.50 At the end of the induction day, those subjects who accepted
the terms and conditions of the job signed an informed consent and completed the first
questionnaire.51
A.4.2 Unemployment and Reemployment
At the beginning of every working day, two assistants would receive the subjects, check their
coder’s ID and inform them about their condition as employed or unemployed for that day.
The assistants would also make sure that every session consisted of 70 minutes of coding
work.
We created involuntary unemployment (shortage of vacancies) in all days except for the
first and last days, when we had full employment. Unemployment increased in the second
and sixth day, and decreased (i.e. vacancies were opened) during the rest of the project.
Table 1 shows the unemployment rate for each working day.
On the days in which there was a negative shock (i.e. an increase in the unemployment
rate), the coders ranked last according to their productivity in the previous day became
unemployed. Unemployed subjects were informed via e-mail of the number of job openings
for the following working day. If they wanted to be considered for the new positions, they
had to reply to that email. Vacancies were filled in according to applicants’ productivity
on their last day employed. We informed subjects their (new) condition on the following
working day.
In order to be considered as part of the labor force, all subjects had to attend their
working session on time, even those who were unemployed. If failed to do so (without any
justified cause, such as illness), they were considered to have withdrawn from the project.
A.5 Remuneration scheme
The remuneration per 90 minutes of work was the market for research assistants in the
universities where the intervention took place. We paid subjects COP$ 14,250 (≈ US$ 8).52
This salary was over four times the minimum wage in Colombia for such working shift.
50Subjects were informed that their answers to these questionnaires were going to be treated anonymously
and would only be used for academic purposes.
51Only one subject out of the three hundred and nighty six who came to the induction day, did not sign
the informed consent. This was the only person who decided not to take the job.
52At the time of the experiment, the average hourly salary of a research assistant was COP$ 10,300 (≈
US$ 4.6).
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In addition, there was a bonus of COP$ 40,000 (≈ US$ 22), payable at the end of the
experiment, for the subject in each group who correctly coded the highest number of news
in a session.
The maximum possible remuneration was US$ 90, earned by subjects who came to the
induction day (US$ 6), were employed during the eight working days (US$ 8 × 8 days
= US$ 64) and won the bonus for best coder of his/her group (US$ 20). The minimum
possible remuneration of someone who participated in the project over the whole period
was US$ 32 if the person was assigned to a treatment with an UBI, and US$ 14 is he/she
was assigned to the Control. To receive the minimum amount, the coder had to come to the
induction day (US$ 6) and worked the first day of work (US$ 8), but remained unemployed
and active since the first day of unemployment. If the coder was assigned to an UBI, then
he/she would receive additional US$ 18 (a US$ 3 unemployment compensation × 6 days).
In order to minimize attrition, we paid the last day of the project. Additionally, subjects
who withdraw from the project without a justified reason were entitled to request only half
of the money earned by the last day they showed up to work.
A.6 Interventions
As mentioned, we implemented three different experimental interventions. The Control
treatment, without any UBI, and two treatments designed to mimic the two main existing
UBIs (Welfare and Workfare).
The amount of the unemployment benefit was identical in the two UBI treatments and
equivalent to a third of the daily shift salary of the employed. This is of course an abstraction
of the real world UBIs, in which unemployment compensations vary, even within countries,
according to several characteristics of the unemployed like the spell of unemployment. While
we do not think that abstracting from this variation is relevant for our experiment, we did
make an effort to to replicate other features of the actual implementation of UBIs. For
instance, when applying for the benefit in reality, unemployed individuals have to fulfill
some requirements, including signing up, filling in paperwork, and showing up regularly
at some administrative office (usually to fill in additional paperwork). We had a similar
procedure in our two treatments: The unemployed who wanted to receive the benefit had
to show up every working day at the time and place of work. If assigned to Welfare the
unemployed could leave immediately after filling in some short questionnaires and receiving
the compensation.53 If assigned to Workfare, the unemployed could choose whether to
complete the ancillary task and get the compensation or to leave without getting paid.54
In any case the unemployed had to show and sign an attendance sheet. Failing to do so
would be equivalent to quit the job altogether and stop being considered part of the labor
force (and not being able to re-apply for a position when new vacants were opened).
For comparability, unemployed coders in the Control treatment were also required to
show up every working day at the time and place of work if they wanted to be considered
53We used the questionnaires to measure various psychological traits that we use when testing the mech-
anisms behind the main result.
54The task, which lasted 30 minutes, was to place letters in envelopes and paste on them randomly assigned
(real) postal addresses. We manipulated the content of the letter in two sub-treatments. A Charity sub-
treatment used letters that asked for donations to a social NGO. A Placebo sub-treatment used letters to
publicize the business of a local private firm. While the existence of these sub-treatments within Workfare
does not affect the incentives exploited for this paper, these data will be used in subsequent companion
papers.
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part of the labor force. Of course, they were invited to leave immediately after filling some
short questionnaires.
Table A.1: Description of groups
Group University Newspaper Treatment Coders day1
1 U. Rosario El Tiempo Welfare 16
2 U. Rosario El Espectador Welfare 18
3 U. Rosario El Espectador Welfare 14
4 U. Rosario El Tiempo Welfare 11
5 U. Andes El Tiempo Workfare 20
6 U. Andes El Espectador Workfare 19
7 U. Andes El Tiempo Workfare 23
8 U. Andes El Espectador Workfare 22
9 U. Andes El Tiempo Workfare 14
10 U. Andes El Espectador Workfare 13
11 U. Andes El Tiempo Workfare 18
12 U. Andes El Espectador Workfare 18
13 U. Rosario El Tiempo Control 20
14 U. Rosario El Tiempo Control 15
15 U. Rosario El Espectador Control 21
16 U. Andes El Tiempo Control 13
17 U. Andes El Tiempo Control 22
18 U. Andes El Espectador Control 13
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